ChatInject: Abusing Chat Templates for Prompt Injection in LLM Agents

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Metric	Model	InjecPrompt default	InjecPrompt *ChatInject*	InjecPrompt *+ think*	InjecPrompt *+ tool*	Multi-turn default	Multi-turn *ChatInject*
AgentDojo							
ASR	Qwen-3	17.5	54.8 (+37.3)	66.1 (+48.6)	**69.4** (+51.9)	60.9	**80.5** (+19.6)
	GPT-oss	0.3	**51.4** (+51.1)	48.6 (+48.3)	47.4 (+47.1)	3.6	**55.5** (+51.9)
	Llama-4	1.0	17.2 (+16.2)	–	**19.8** (+18.8)	1.8	**11.1** (+9.3)
	GLM-4.5	0.3	20.3 (+20.0)	24.8 (+24.5)	**36.0** (+35.7)	17.5	**48.1** (+30.6)
	Kimi-K2	5.9	29.3 (+23.4)	–	**44.2** (+38.3)	12.3	**13.9** (+1.6)
	Grok-2	6.1	**19.3** (+13.2)	–	–	23.7	**24.7** (+1.0)
Utility	Qwen-3	50.9	28.3 (-22.6)	24.4 (-26.5)	**22.9** (-28.0)	52.4	**27.5** (-24.9)
	GPT-oss	19.6	18.8 (-0.8)	11.1 (-8.5)	**9.0** (-10.6)	38.3	**8.0** (-30.3)
	Llama-4	16.5	15.9 (-0.6)	–	**14.7** (-1.8)	18.5	**16.2** (-2.3)
	GLM-4.5	78.4	67.9 (-10.5)	**65.7** (-12.7)	68.1 (-10.3)	75.8	**67.9** (-7.9)
	Kimi-K2	71.5	**35.0** (-36.5)	–	35.2 (-36.3)	72.0	**69.9** (-2.1)
	Grok-2	41.7	**29.8** (-11.9)	–	–	33.9	**31.9** (-2.0)

- ASR ↑, Utility ↓
- Multi-turn ChatInject is the best
- + <think> or <tool call> hooks boosts attack performance



- Transferability increases with template embedding similarity.

Model	Template default	Qwen-3	GPT-oss	Llama-4	GLM-4.5	Kimi-K2	Grok-2	Gemma-3	Avg.
InjecAgent									
Qwen-3	8.6	**39.4** (+30.8)	3.0 (-5.6)	4.1 (-4.5)	3.2 (-5.4)	35.8 (+27.2)	3.1 (-5.5)	11.3 (+2.7)	13.6
GPT-oss	0.2	0.1 (-0.1)	**14.1** (+13.9)	0.2 (+0.0)	0.0 (-0.2)	0.4 (+0.2)	0.1 (-0.1)	0.5 (+0.3)	2.0
Llama-4	50.1	22.2 (-27.9)	23.8 (-26.3)	**79.3** (+29.2)	14.0 (-36.1)	31.7 (-18.4)	17.1 (-33.0)	40.5 (-9.6)	**34.8**
GLM-4.5	0.0	0.2 (+0.2)	0.3 (+0.3)	0.1 (+0.1)	**57.2** (+57.2)	0.0 (+0.0)	0.1 (+0.1)	0.1 (+0.1)	7.3
Kimi-K2	15.6	53.7 (+38.1)	13.9 (-1.7)	40.4 (+24.8)	9.7 (-5.9)	**67.3** (+51.7)	14.7 (-0.9)	24.2 (+8.6)	29.9
Grok-2	16.4	12.8 (-3.6)	7.8 (-8.6)	3.6 (-12.8)	1.1 (-15.3)	6.1 (-10.3)	**16.6** (+0.2)	–	9.2
Avg.	15.2	21.4	10.5	21.3	14.2	**23.5**	8.6	15.3	–
GPT-4o†	9.6	**31.7** (+22.1)	**23.6** (+14.0)	3.2 (-6.4)	2.3 (-7.3)	22.9 (+13.3)	0.7 (-8.9)	3.9 (-5.7)	12.2
Grok-3†	2.3	29.8 (+27.5)	7.5 (+5.2)	8.8 (+6.5)	2.4 (+0.1)	21.7 (+19.4)	**19.7** (+17.4)	**50.9** (+48.6)	**17.9**
Gemini-pro†	1.4	**27.4** (+26.0)	14.3 (+12.9)	6.8 (+5.4)	7.8 (+6.4)	14.5 (+13.1)	9.9 (+8.5)	**20.2** (+18.8)	12.8
Avg.	4.4	**29.6**	15.1	6.3	4.2	19.7	10.1	25.0	–

- Qwen-family templates transfers well.
- We can target closed LLMs with same-family model templates.

Why ChatInject?



- **Indirect Prompt Injection:** Attackers embed hidden instructions in tool outputs, causing agents to execute malicious actions, as if they are legitimate prompts.
- **Key Insights:** Current prompt injection attacks rely on plain-text manipulation, overlooking **structural vulnerabilities** in modern LLMs.
- **Role hierarchies in chat template:** LLMs use special tokens to segment inputs into roles: *<system>, <user>, <assistant>, <tool>*. Instruction hierarchy enforces priority: system > user > assistant > tool output. Special tokens (e.g., <|start|>system) serve as trust boundaries.
- **Susceptibility to persuasive multi-turn context:** Multi-turn approaches are highly effective in jailbreaking. Dialogues establish context, decompose instructions into harmless steps, secure assistant agreement.

Attack Payload Construction



- **Abusing Role-Based Chat Template Hierarchies (*ChatInject*):**
  - Forge role tags within tool outputs to impersonate higher-priority roles
  - Wrap attacker prefix in system role tags
    → Treated as system instruction
  - Wrap malicious instruction in user role tags
    → Treated as user command
  - Model re-interprets attacker payload as authoritative instruction
- **Template-Based Multi-Turn Persuasion (*Multi-turn Variant*):**
  - Multi-turn attacks are effective but require interactive dialogue
  - Prompt injection is one-shot — attacker can't engage turn-by-turn
  - Models are instruction-tuned to follow role-based conventions
  - Embed forged role tags to construct virtual multi-turn conversation -> raw conversation text become active.



- To unknown agent, MoT improves ASR by bundling candidate wrappers.



- ChatInject defeats current defenses.
- External detectors can lower ASR, but they also lower Utility.



- Natural Countermeasure: Parsing chat templates
- Light perturbations (remove / replace / insert) can bypass such defenses.

Key Takeaways

1. ChatInject dramatically increases ASR by exploiting chat template role structures — from 5% to 32% (AgentDojo) and 15% to 46% (InjecAgent).
2. Template-based payloads transfer across models (including closed-source LLMs) — template similarity predicts transferability.
3. Existing defenses are ineffective; perturbed multi-turn variants are especially robust against targeted countermeasures.